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POLITICAL CORRUPTION:  
ESTABLISHING THE PARAMETERS 
Peter deLeon and Mark T. Green 
ABSTRACT 
This article considers the potential contribution of the New Public Management (NPM) 
to address a number of World Bank suggestions dealing with political accountability 
improving the management of the public sector. Previously, (deLeon and Green, 2001) 
we posed a similar set of questions, but were only able to address them through 
examples drawn from the American political system. The argument was made that an 
examination of United States incidents of political corruption would at least test the 
theory that modernity ameliorates political corruption. We now cast a somewhat wider 
net, looking at other developed nations as well as the US, to ask the central question: 
what effects would NPM have on the incidents of political corruption across a number 
of nations? 
INTRODUCTION 
The presence of political corruption possibly predates the historical record. For years, it 
was viewed as an artifact of political development, a common malignancy that nations 
would naturally reject as a function of their respective national maturations; this was 
one of the underlying theses of the American progressive movement. However, this 
cleansing has been neither as straightforward nor as natural as its proponents would 
argue. An anti-corruption coalition established in the 1990 under the umbrella of 
Transparency International (TI) has brought a new light on the world of political 
corruption. TI annually publishes a Corruption Perception Index that in 2001 ranked 
over 90 nations in terms of their perceived political corruptions. Peter Eigen, the TI 
Chairman, observed that There is no end in sight to the misuse of power by those in 
public office--and corruption levels are perceived to be as high as ever in both the 
developed and developing nations” (Transparency International Press Release, 2001).1  
Anecdotally, cases of corruption continue to intrude onto national agenda. In August 
2003, The Economist lead editorial asked Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi to 
resign for numerous indiscretions, including having his ruling party vote him amnesty 
while in served as Prime Minister (Anonymous, 2003a); Berlusconi’s case was 
particularly illuminating since he was forced to testify at his own bribery trial (Bruni, 
2003a),2 which he immediately amending by declaring in an interview with the New 
York Times that he was the ultimate defending of Italian freedom (Bruni, 2003a). In 
France, the former Prime Minister, under President Jacques Chirac, Alain Juppe, has 
been charged with illegally solicited funds for their former political party in the mid-
1980s (Tagliabue, 2003). Buddy Cianci, the long-time (and often re-elected) mayor of 
Providence (Rhode Island) was convicted of racketeering and sent to federal prison 
(Stanton, 2003). Lastly, the collapse of the most recent negotiations of the World Trade 
Organization (in Cancun, Mexico) floundered (at least in part) on the inability of the 
developed and less-developed nations (the latter forming a coalition of 21 developing 
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nations) to agree on how (or even if) corruption should be a WTO priority (Anonymous, 
2003b). In short, the baleful presence of political corruption continues, today more so 
than ever.3  
Within the last few years, the World Bank has focused some of its activities on political 
corruption, which it viewed as a detriment to the continuation of an orderly and 
equitable process of economic development in Third and Fourth World nations. Thus, 
the World Bank has argued for the elimination of political corruption (which it defined 
as“the abuse of public office for private gain”) through the employment of five key 
elements: 
1. Increasing Political Accountability; 
2. Strengthening Civil Society Participation; 
3. Creating a Competitive Private Sector; 
4. Institutional Restraints on Power; and 
5. Improving Public Sector Management.  
This essay considers the potential contribution of the New Public Management (NPM) 
to address a number of the World Bank’s suggestions, specifically, those dealing with 
political accountability and, of course, improving the management of the public sector. 
The authors’ initial attempt along these lines (deLeon and Green, 2001) posed a similar 
set of questions, but was only able to address those questions through examples drawn 
from the American political system. At the time, the argument was made that an 
examination of the United States’ incidents of political corruption would at least test the 
theory that modernity ameliorates political corruption.4 We now cast a somewhat wider 
net, looking at other developed nations as well as the US, to ask the central question: 
what effects would NPM have on the incidents of political corruption across a number 
of nations? 
We need first to pose a number of reservations on this analysis. First, as we have 
indicated above, we are only addressing political corruption among the economically 
developed nations, typically those nations within the OECD, and most often within the 
European/American bloc of nations. While this restriction would undercut any 
pretensions towards a more general theory of political corruption, the number of 
additional considerations (e.g., political, social, economic, and cultural) that would have 
to be entertained to responsibly include the nations of the developing world is simply 
beyond the scope of the present enterprise. Put in a more positive vein, there is more 
than ample evident of political corruptions within the developed nations upon which to 
base the present analysis.   
A second, perhaps more of a semantic reservation, is in order. Much of the current 
literature on political corruption has focused on what many (e.g., Drew, 1999; Etzioni, 
1984) might call the 800 pound gorilla -- campaign financing. Drew (1999), for one, has 
termed the conditions surrounding campaign financing as one of the most poisonous 
elements in contemporary society. But one man’s poison is another’s elixir that is, the 
issue of campaign finance is a highly contentious issue. In the United States, for 
instance, many, such US Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY), have strongly suggested 
that campaign financing is part and parcel of free speech in America and cannot be 
curtailed; in this, he claims the support of the US Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo 
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(also, see Burke, 2002). Others (e.g., della Portia and Vannucci, 2002; and Golden, 
2000) talk to campaign financing as a central contributor to corruption within the Italian 
political system, and Susan Pharr (2002) argues that it is pivotal to Japanese perceptions 
of political elections; the French polity suffers similarly, although concern there is 
somewhat diminished by what Pujas and Rhodes (2002) call a culture of “political 
hypocricy.” There is little doubt that politics and political corruption can and do go 
hand-in-hand, but until some sort of agreement can be reached on the general 
permissibility or illegality of such relationships, they need to be treated more as 
propositions than as definitive evidence. 
This essay will briefly presents an overview of research in political corruption as a way 
of introducing the problem. Next, it sets out the general tenets of NPM and extracts a 
series of concepts and measurements that, if designed and implemented, should reduce 
the amount of political corruption. We then offer up a reviews of some relatively recent 
acts could be described as corruptions, as well as referring to the US cases largely 
described in our earlier essay (deLeon and Green, 2001). Finally, we will comment on 
the intersections, with particular focus on both what we have learned and what remains 
in an NPM research agenda regarding political corruption. 
AN ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION 
Traditionally, public administration and public management (that are, after all, 
disciplines that traffic in “good government”) have viewed corruption as a rare 
occurrence. The recent conviction of US Congressman James Traficant (D-OH) and his 
disbarment from the House of Representatives illustrates the “bad apple” syndrome ( D. 
Johnston, 2001; Clines, 2002). When such a situation occurs, it is typically treated an 
isolated (usually egregious) issue of public accountability, one in which ethical behavior 
and education are inevitably portrayed as the ready remedy (Caiden and Caiden, 1977). 
Alternatively, Quah (1999) has asserted that the solution belongs in a stronger central 
political authority, with his principal example being his native Singapore. Political 
science has been much more open in its recognition of political corruption (e.g., M. 
Johnston, 1982; Benson et al., 1978) but even here, the empirical literature has been 
characterized as “not extensive” (Meier and Holbrook, 1992: 135) and policy 
recommendations are murky.5 Economists have generally have treated corruption as 
little more than (in their jargon) “side payments”, that is, a worrisome but largely 
inconsequential (as we will see, it is not an especially “expensive”) condition.  
The important exception is Susan Rose-Ackerman (1978; also, Rose-Ackerman, 1998), 
who makes two important observations: first, that corruption is most likely to occur at 
the vital intersection between the public and private sectors, i.e., between public goods 
and personal gain (also see M. Johnston, 1982); and second, that corruption can best be 
described as an inherent, systemic activity, as opposed to the insular, case study 
perspective of public administration scholars.  In this latter observation, Rose-
Ackerman  
is in close agreement with sociologist Robert K Merton (1968), who argues that 
corruption often serves a manifest, desired social and political function; if the 
recognized government is unable to provide a good or service (say, dependable 
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policing), there will be occasions for people to engage in “side payments” to obtain the 
desired articles or services, at times on a systematic basis. 
Public policy and public management scholars cannot afford academic detachment of 
economists and sociologists. We will strongly agree with Rose-Ackerman (1998) and 
Robert Klitgaard (1988) that if political corruption is found to be “inefficient,” i.e., that 
it somehow distracts from the cost-efficient operations of government, especially in the 
long-term, then public management must be directly concerned with countering 
corruption and its costs. 
Drawing from these disciplines, let us begin with a basic definition of political 
corruption, recognizing, with Michael Johnston (1986: 379) that “We should not expect 
to find a sharp distinction between corruption and non-corrupt actions. Instead, we will 
find fine gradations of judgment, reflecting a variety of equivocations, mitigating 
circumstances, and attributed motives.” Our proposed definition suggests that the 
typical public administration and economic assumption -- that currency lies at the root 
of political corruption -- is incomplete, because alternative means of valued currency or 
exchange (clan, fame, patriotism, etc.) can be involved. Thus, we posit our working 
definition: a co-operative form of unsanctioned, usually condemned policy influence for 
some type of significant personal gain, in which the currency could be economic, 
political, or ideological remuneration (deLeon, 1983: 25).   
The question then poses itself: granted that corruption exists, should public management 
be concerned with it? Some have suggested that in developing nations, corruption might 
even serve as a benevolent management tool in terms of political recruitment (Nye, 
1967).  But this recognition extends beyond recruitment activities. For the owner of a 
diner to give a dough nut to the cop on the beat could easily be construed as a low-level 
form of bribery, but it might just as justifiably be viewed as a form of direct taxation for 
a police retainer, services rendered, or maybe as little more than a tip for overtime; 
similarly, a bribe might be considered a user’s fee for overcoming a bureaucratic 
bottleneck, just another (albeit illegal) business expense, perhaps akin to insurance. 
Klitgaard,(1988: 33) captures the idea: “…if the prevailing system is bad, then 
corruption may be good.”  
We claim, however, that this arguments is fundamentally wrong on at least two counts. 
The first addresses economic or opportunity costs. Activities we would consider corrupt 
(especially if we include illegal drug activities) divert large amounts of resources from 
the public sector, money that could easily be spent better elsewhere (see Klitgaard, 
1988; Rose-Ackerman, 1998). In the US in the 1990s, deLeon (1993: 33) 
“guesstimated,” (given that there is no accurate way of “knowing”) the “costs” of 
corruption (particularly if one includes the so-called “victimless crimes” like 
prostitution) in the tens of billions of dollars; world wide, this estimate could easily run 
into the low hundreds of billions of dollars, and more if one calculates in the corruption 
in the public health services (e.g., AIDS vaccines and food distribution services in 
southern Africa and Southeast Asia). Still, in a world economy that runs into the tens of 
trillions of dollars, this is hardly a lethal financial wound.  
However, a straightforward cost-benefit analysis (assuming for a moment that both 
costs and benefits could be accurately assessed) of the harm caused by corruption would 
need to be more than an accounting exercise. It is much more complex because of 
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confounding complications like time frames, the state of specific national economies, 
and, most centrally, the expectations of a nation’s people as they see corruption 
inequitably sapping their economy and well-being.6 Writing primarily about Japan and 
South Korea, Pharr (2002: 841) generalizes, “Civic-ness,…is fundamental to social trust 
and attitudes of cooperation that in turn promote and sustain good government.” As 
political scientists from Almond and Verba (1960) to Frank Fukuyama (1994) to Robert 
Putnam (2000) remind us, “trust” is the essential national “glue” necessary in any nation 
building (or maintaining) exercise.  
The second concern posits: if corruption is all-but inevitable, simply accept it as a minor 
cost of democratic governance. The former Prime Minister of Italy, Bettino Craxi, most 
clearly depicted the “everybody does it” argument (or what sociologists like Merton 
refer to as the “functionalist” argument) in his 1992 speech to the Italian Chamber of 
Deputies: 
The political parties have been the body and soul of our democratic structures…. 
[U]nder the cover of irregular funding to the parties, cases of corruption and 
extortion have flourished and become intertwined... What needs to be said, and 
which in any case everybody knows, is that the greater part of political funding is 
irregular or illegal…. If the greater part of this is to be considered criminal pure 
and simple then the greater part of the political system is a criminal system. I do 
not believe there is anybody in this hall who has had the responsibility for a large 
organization who can stand up and deny what I have just said. Sooner or later the 
facts would make a liar of him (Craxi’s speech is quoted in della Porta and 
Vannucci: 717-718; emphases added).7 
Thus, if corruption is little more than part and parcel of democratic governance and 
going to happen anyway, why expend valuable resources on something that will happen 
in any case? In response, we claim that there is little choice (see deLeon, 1993), that 
“minor” corruptions too often metastasize into larger ones, i.e., the dough nut on the 
beat segues into a bottle of scotch that seamlessly becomes a protection payment. 
Moreover, there are too many examples when citizens might have recognized the 
functional nature of corruption as a latent form of governance, and still found cause to 
remove its practitioners from positions of authority. Lastly, at its base, corruption is 
simply inequitable in terms of democratic governance, its accesses, and its citizens, if 
not in the short run, then surely over the long run (see D. Kaufman, 1997). When an 
individual acts as if he somehow personifies government -- as might have been the case 
when former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl solicited funds that remain unaccounted 
for (see Anonymous, 2002) or the former Foreign Minister of France accepted a bribe 
from a lobbyist who also happens to be his mistress (Anonymous, 2000) -- then the 
democratic underpinnings and financial assurances of government are potentially at 
risk. As Klitgaard (1988: 42) cautions, “Whereas an occasion act of corruption may be 
efficient, corruption once systematized and deeply ingrained never is.” 
Let us assert a few benchmarks. First, most public affairs scholars have recognized the 
destructive nature of corruption in both political and economic terms. The traffic in 
corruption fundamentally skews the political process by confusing or substituting 
private gains for public goods. Public administration scholars propose “remedies” of 
greater education, higher ethical standards (Frederickson, 1999; Garafolo, et al., 1997), 
higher wages for administrators (in developing nations), or greater centralized authority 
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(Quah, 1999) but these have not proven to be particularly effective. These shortcomings 
argue for more structural changes. Second, corruption is an important area for continued 
study, both for its generic activities as well as for the more specific question of how the 
NPM might ameliorate the condition, especially in light of the World Bank’s charge 
(supra: 2-3). Let us now briefly review the relevant NPM theoretic and applied 
literatures, focusing on the nexus between the public and private sectors. 
EVALUATING THE UNDERPINNINGS OF NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 
Many public administration scholars during the 1990s warned about the problems 
associated with implementing new public management reforms in their respective 
country’s bureaucracy (Lynn, 1998). Their recurrent theme centered an entrepreneurial 
form of government. George Frederickson (1999) claims that entrepreneurial 
government will somehow lead to an abuse of administrative powers, an absence of 
democratic responsibility, and ultimately political corruption. There is little argument 
that an entrepreneurial government is a conceptual bedrock of NPM in that it is required 
to make sustainable changes in the managerial ranks. Moreover, it is certainly true that 
an element of adopted NPM reforms is a certain level of empowered government 
entrepreneurs capable of making innovative decisions without the usual system of 
checks and balances.  
However, a more complete reading of the NPM texts goes well beyond the reliance of 
entrepreneurial government (Barzelay, 1992; Osborne and Gaebler, 1993; Holmes and 
Shand, 1995; Stokes, 1996; OECD 1996). We earlier identified on theoretic and 
practices bases a number of key features of NPM, as schematically set out in Table 1. 










Holmes and Shand (1995) 
 
Shift from the public 
interest to a focus on 





Closer focus on results in 
terms of efficiency, 
effectiveness and quality 
service 
 
More strategic or results oriented 
(efficiency, effectiveness, and 
service quality) approach to 
decision making  
Shift from efficiency to a 












decisions on resource 
allocation are made 
closer to the point of 
delivery 
 
The replacement of highly 
centralized hierarchical 
organizational structures with 
decentralized management 
environments where decisions 
on resource allocation and 
service delivery are take closer 
the point of delivery, where 
greater relevant information is 
available and which provide 
scope for feedback from clients 
and other interest groups  
Shift from administration 





The flexibility to explore 
alternatives to direct 
public provision and 
regulation that might 
yield more cost-effective 
policy outcomes 
 
Flexibility to explore alternatives 
to direct public provision which 
might provide more cost 
effective policy outcomes 
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Shift from control to a 
focus on winning 




A greater focus on 
efficiency in the services 
provided directly by the 
public sector, involving 
the establishment of 
productivity target and 
the creation of 
competitive 
environments within and 
among the public sector 
organizations 
Focus attention on the matching 
of authority and responsibility as 
a key to improving performance, 
including through such 
mechanisms as explicit 
performance contracting 
 
Shift from specifying 
functions, authority and 
structures to focus on 
identifying missions, 









The creation of competitive 
environments within and 
between public sector 
organizations 
 
Shift form justifying costs 








The strengthening of strategic 
capacities at the center to “steer” 
government to respond to 
external changes and diverse 
interest quickly, flexibly and at 
least cost  
Shift from enforcing 
responsibility to a focus 







Greater accountability and 
transparency through 
requirements to report results 
and their full cost  
Shift from simply 
following rules and 
procedures to a focus on 
understanding and 
applying norms, 










Service-wide budgeting and 
management systems to support 
and encourage the changes. 
 
Shift from simply 
operating administrative 
systems to a focus on 





incentives, measuring and 



















Table 1 reflects such managerial components as accountability, transparency, efficiency, 
and performance. Certainly, in the minds of NPM scholars such as Barzelay (1992) or 
Kettl (2000), improvements in these areas – that is, not just in entreprenuerism -- can 
only enhance public services (see Cohen and Eimicke, 1999).  
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Taken collectively, NPM principles represent a coherent and interdependent 
constellation of managerial elements. (OECD, 1996; PUMA, 1995, 1996a, 1996b, 
1996c, 1997; Uhr, 1999). NPM reforms offer a well-integrated NPM managerial 
agenda; adopting the values of entrepreneurial government, rule flexibility, and 
privatization also requires the accompanying functional reforms, such as improved 
management information systems, performance based monitoring, and enhanced 
incentive structures. Thus, NPM reforms need to identify and adopt a relatively 
complete set of NPM principles and functions (Ferris and Graddy, 1997; Frant, 1998; 
Jones and Thompson, 1999) or risk key gaps. We begin with a short exposition of the 
theory underlying NPM’s functional reforms.  To address these matters, we should first 
address basic theories upon which NPM is based. 
Fundamental to an understanding of the NPM practice is the concept of "transaction 
costs" (see Williamson and Masten, 1995; Menard, 1997), which Ferris and Graddy 
(1997: 91) define as "the costs (other than price) associated with carrying out two-sided 
transactions -- that is, the exchange of goods or services from one individual to another 
with agreed-upon payment for performance. These costs vary with the nature of the 
transaction and the way it is organized." Basically, transaction cost analysis suggests 
that successful firms will try to minimize these costs. Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase 
(1937) had previously argued that organizations were composed by a series of formal 
and informal contracts that determined by the characteristics of the transaction costs. 
Typically, the employer would subsume these contracts under one contract, which 
specified the employer-employer relationship within certain limits (Coase 1937; Miller 
1992). This relationship later became known as "principal-agent" theory.  
The principal-agent relationship is inherently problematic. In Jones and Thompson’s 
(1999: 1) words "…a) the efforts of the agent cannot be perfectly observed; b) the 
interests of agent and principal diverge; and c) agents pursue their own interests, i.e. 
behave opportunistically." Moreover, at least in theory, there are information 
asymmetries: the principal has an overview of the firm’s objective while the agent has a 
better view of the day-to-day operation in the immediate sector. And neither actor 
wishes to reveal his/her information completely, for fear of surrendering her/his 
comparative (bureaucratic) advantage. Therefore, the practical task of the principal-
agent relationship is to justify and respect the two perspectives.  
Jones and Thompson (1999) have observed that bureaucratic hierarchical organizations 
developed specialized rules (codified as “contracts”) that outline clearly which activities 
are allowed and those that are prohibited under a principal-agents regimen, as well as 
specifying the sanctions for violating the rules. The problem with the rule-based mode 
of control, however, is that scarce resources (such as human capital) must be expended 
to monitor the rules instead of allocated toward performance. To address the principal-
agent problem, NPM suggests that end results -- not process -- provide clearer, more 
discerning information regarding the actors’ (respective) preferences and thereby leads 
one to design better incentive systems in the context of the organization. By providing 
better information to the principal, the agent’s activities can monitored, resulting in 
what economists refer to as "transparency" (Jones and Thompson, 1999). Furthermore, 
this information can counter the tendency by agents to serve their self-interest or, again, 
in the language of the economist (and some street gangs), the tendency to "shirk." These 
capabilities are immensely enhanced by advances in modern management information 
systems. 
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The evidence supporting these assertions has a long history of application, albeit in the 
private sector. Better information systems and incentive structures regarding the 
principal-agent relationship was a direct result of the rise of industrialization in the early 
part of the 20th century. Moving from a craftsman production mode to a production 
system of mass-production assembly line mode (i.e., multiplying the number of 
contractual relationships) required more accurate systems of monitoring, coordinating, 
and (in many cases) bargaining, in particular, the evolution of modern cost accounting 
systems and accrual based accounting. Thus, the employer ("principal") could more 
easily monitor the activities and performance of workers (“agents”) from the 
perspective of the firm. 
There are, of course, noted shortcomings to principal-agents theory when its monitoring 
activities are applied to the public sector. For instance, labor unions provided a means 
by which unwieldy individual contracts could be aggregated.8 There is a growing 
awareness that principal-agents is a uni-directionable management procedure, in which 
the principal somehow manages to ride "herd" on the agents (Fischer, 1990). Alternative 
public management protocols stress such ideas such as a participatory managerial 
concept, in which agents and principals reach consensual agreements as to goals and 
missions, a more democratic regimen if you will (deLeon and deLeon, 2002). 
Furthermore, the public sector is, in many ways, different than its private sector 
counterpart; for example, Moe (1984) has suggested that the public sector is directed by 
a multitude (or confusion) of principals such as elected representatives, administrative 
executives, and a variety of superior-subordinate relationships (e.g., civil service) within 
the organization itself. In addition, the public and private sectors are often perceived as 
driven by differing sets of normative concerns; this distinction can most readily be 
viewed as their respective emphases of "efficiency" vs. "equity" tenets (Okun, 1975). 
The ultimate "principals" in the public organization are, of course, the citizens 
themselves and depending on their own policy and program preferences, associated 
principals and agents can be sent (or receive) a variety of conflicting signals (Ferris and 
Graddy, 1998). All of these conditions can result in obscured systems of managerial 
transparency and accountability. These lead, in turn, to different managerial concepts 
and approaches.  
This concern is especially germane with regard to financial matters (e.g., budgeting and 
accounting) given that the political process has the greatest influence on the 
management systems (Jones, 1992). Traditionally, public sector budgeting fails to 
provide a clear picture of program effectiveness. Furthermore, budgeting (Wildavsky, 
1964) and even audits (Power, 1993) are primarily driven by politics; any sense of 
accountability is geared towards politics rather than management. As the record of 
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) points out (Radin, 1998), public 
sector evaluation is beset by a series of political and methodological compromises that 
render its precise managerial application problematic. While private sector accounting 
can be obscured (witness the example of Enron, whose ally was the accounting firm of 
Arthur Anderson), the opportunities for accounting mischief are easily multiplied in the 
public sector. 
In summary, NPM offers several constructs that would be useful in combating the 
excesses of political corruption; these include community-owned government, 
competitive government, mission-driven government, and results-oriented government 
that is enterprising, anticipatory, and decentralized. Modern accounting and 
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management information systems are necessary adjuncts to these NPM principals. This 
brief review also indicates some potential oversights:  
•  while some appreciative nod has been given to the institutional features of an 
organization, there is little indication as to what are the key organizational 
variables that would hinder/facilitate the introduction of NPM; that is, all 
organizations are treated by NPM as roughly isomorphic; 
•  even though democratic systems are seemingly inferred, there is no direct 
discussion of the values indicated by that political system; that is, at its basis, 
NPM appears to be largely indifferent to political ideologies; it should produce 
laudatory managerial results regardless of its ideological bedrock; and 
•  potential corruptors are possibly just as versed in the necessary accounting and 
monitoring procedures as their NPM counterparts and, if they so choose, can 
potentially counter or avoid them. 
With these overviews of both political corruption and NPM in hand, we can now turn to 
incidents of recent political corruptions to examine how NPM would have addressed 
them. In conjunction with earlier examples (see deLeon and Green, 2001), we will then 
consider the potential effects of NPM on corrupt conditions. 
STUDY OF NOTEWORTHY CASES OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION 
To help understand the capabilities of the NPM to guard against political corruption, we 
briefly discuss a few recent cases of what many (although surely not all) might view as 
corrupt actions.  While we will later include discussions of national policies relating to 
campaign finance reforms (e.g., in Italy, the US, France, and Germany), in this section 
we will deal with three specific cases: the so-called “Travelgate” that occurred during 
the early days of the Clinton Administration in the US; the trials of former German 
Prime Minister Helmut Kohl; and an account of recent press reporting that indicates 
pervasive political corruption in France. 
Travelgate 
The Clinton Presidency did not begin especially well. By April 1992, the 
Administration was troubled by numerous transitional difficulties. For instance, the 
newly appointed Attorney-General, Janet Reno, took full responsibility for the FBI 
attack on the Branch Davidian compound at Waco, Texas, and the resulting 
conflagration, while the White House did not issue a statement until well after the 
incident. So it was with particular embarrassment that on May 18, the President was 
reported in the national press of closing down air traffic at Los Angeles International 
Airport to have a haircut in Air Force One from Beverly Hills hair stylist Cristophe 
(usual fee, about $200). The following day, White House Press Secretary Dee Dee 
Myers announced that seven members of the White House Travel Office -- that had the 
responsibility of arranging commercial (i.e., not on Air Force One) travel arrangements 
for the White House staff and the attendant press corps when they were traveling with 
the President -- were being terminated.  “Travelgate” was thus offered up on the 
presidential stage, which was to be scripted through at least four separate investigations 
and a press corps that seeming saw one of its cherished prerogatives threatened. 
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During the 1992 presidential election, Catherine Cornelius (a distant cousin of the 
President) had served as Clinton’s liaison to World Wide Travel, which was owned by 
fellow Arkansan Betty Carney.  Both wanted to continue working for President Clinton, 
particularly since World Wide Travel had made a reported profit in excess of over one 
million dollars during the campaign. Larry Watkins, one of Clinton’s principal 
campaign aides, was the nexus, having once worked for World Wide as well as having 
been a business associate of Ms Clinton’s in Little Rock. Rounding out this cast of 
central players were two more Arkansans, Harry Thomason and wife, Linda 
Bloodworth-Thomason, famously (if unofficially) known as “Friends of Bill” (FOB).  
In December 31, 1992, Cornelius sent Watkins a memorandum, suggesting that if 
Clinton were to “privatize” the Travel Office, it would permit him to cut back the size 
of the staff (Clinton had promised to reduce the size of the White House staff by 25%) 
and result in better air fares; she also suggested the possibility that World Wide Travel 
(if chosen) could rebate back to the White House 3.5% of its usual commission, 
estimated to be approximately $210,000. In a January 26, 1993, memorandum to 
Watkins, Cornelius proposed that she and a friend assume the operating responsibilities 
of the Travel Office; thereupon, Watkins had both named as White House assistants. 
Finally, on February 15, Cornelius wrote Watkins a third memorandum, which again 
emphasized that the elimination of the Travel Office would result in a more efficient 
operation (including a reduction of costs), as well as (emphases in original 
memorandum): 
1. Incoming Clinton Administration More Comfortable and Familiar with this 
Proven System. 
2. Recommended Staff are More Knowledgeable and Familiar with the 
Personalities Involved as well as the System; thus, allowing for BETTER 
SERVICE. 
These recommendations clearly inserted a partisan tone to the discussions since the 
existing Travel Office was staffed with career civil servants who were presumed not to 
be necessarily friendly with members of the Clinton Administration.  
At roughly the same time, Harry Thomason -- who, in his FOB position had 
choreographed the Inauguration and had been accorded a White House pass, complete 
with office and telephone -- asked Press Secretary Myers if the “White House [Travel 
Office] charter business was subject to competitive bidding” and was referred to Billy 
Dale, the long-time Director of the Travel Office. Thomason then sent his business 
partner, Darnell Martens, to speak with Dale about becoming the travel broker for the 
White House. Dale was neither enthusiastic nor supportive, bluntly telling Martens (as 
he later recounted in an undated memorandum to Thomason), “…there was no possible 
combination of price/service under which [you] could earn the White House business 
and to not waste his time discussing the matter.” Martens also indicated to Thomason 
that the Travel Office had been using a, “Republican-operated charter airline” that he 
accused of not fully charging the press corps during the 1992 campaign as a way of 
currying media favor for President Bush, charges the accused firm as well as members 
of the press denied. 
Finally, in early March, Martens indicated to Thomason that he had heard “rumors” 
about corruption (allegedly, “kickbacks” from the airlines) in the Travel Office. 
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Thomason passed along all of this information to Larry Watkins, who assigned 
Cornelius to the Travel Office to gather additional information on its operations, with 
instructions to report back to him by May 15. In the meantime, Thomason brought up 
during one of his informal conversations with the President what he called “trouble” in 
the White House Travel Office.  
On May 12, Watkins and Cornelius met with Thomason and Martens. Later that day, 
Watkins and Cornelius met again with Thomason, with White House Deputy Counsel 
Vincent Foster and Associate Counsel William Kennedy joining them. Cornelius 
presented what she had observed during her assignment in the Travel Office, but 
apparently her evidence was insufficient to support charges, so Foster ordered Kennedy 
to instruct the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to initiate an immediate 
investigation of the Travel Office. While the FBI investigators were not initially 
persuaded with the charges, at the insistence of Kennedy and later Foster -- and by the 
intimation that the “highest levels of the White House” were concerned -- the Bureau 
opened an investigation on May 13. After some prompting by the White House, it 
became “criminal” in nature, according to a subsequent FBI press release.  
Unbeknownst to the FBI, on May 13, Watkins and Foster also set in motion a plan to 
have the Travel Office audited by a representative of the accounting firm KPMG Peat 
Marwick, who (by coincidence) was serving in the Vice President’s office as part of the 
Vice President’s National Performance Review (NPR). A GAO report later indicated, 
however, that at this Watkins-Foster meeting, the decision was made to fire the staff of 
the Travel Office, even though Chief of Staff Mack McLarty insisted that the 
termination not take place until after the Peat Marwick report was finished, which had 
not even been started until the morning of May 14. There was still the matter of FBI 
pending investigation, which the White House had just convinced the FBI of its 
immediacy.  
Foster managed to delay somehow the start of the FBI study until after the Peat 
Marwick report was completed, no small feat since the FBI had only reluctantly joined 
the fray. 
At this point, Watkins chose to brief the First Lady, Hillary Clinton. His notes, later 
released to the Congressional hearings, quoted her saying “Harry [Thomason] says his 
people can run things better, save money, etc.” In the subsequent GAO study, Ms. 
Clinton, replying by letter, wrote that she did not remember using those “exact” words. 
The Peat Marwick review team worked over the weekend and briefed its draft report to 
Watkins on the following Monday, May 17, prefaced by the disclaimer: 
Our procedures do not constitute an audit, examination, or review in accordance 
with standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants and, therefore, we do not express an opinion or any other form of 
assurance on the information presented in our report. (Peat Marwick, 1998) 
Based on the draft, however, Watkins wrote a memorandum to McLarty (with a copy to 
the First Lady) explaining how the report had provided grounds for firing the entire 
Travel Office staff, because, he later explained, he believed that the staff worked 
together “interchangeably.”  
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On the morning of 19 May, Watkins wrote a brief press announcement for Press 
Secretary Myers, indicating that the Travel Office staff was being released as the result 
of a “routine review conducted as part of the Vice President’s” NPR program; in the 
background notes, he also mentioned the on-going FBI review. He then met with the 
staff of the White House Travel Office to inform them that they were all being 
terminated, based on charges of “mismanagement” alluded to in the Peat Marwick 
report. They were told to gather their belongings and leave the building immediately. In 
the meantime, Foster and Kennedy altered Myers’ text to exclude the FBI investigation, 
but, unknown to them, she had already briefed two reporters on the Travel Office 
dismissal, including the FBI’s investigation. As a result, the FBI criminal investigation 
was public knowledge literally before the Travel Office staff was aware of its existence.  
In retrospect, as Drew (1994) commented, the ensuing “uproar was out of proportion,” 
especially since five of the seven dismissed employees were reinstated to the federal 
civil service within a week of being fired, assured by the Justice Department that they 
were neither “targets nor subjects of the pending criminal investigation,” and ultimately 
reassigned. Congress, with the concurrence of the White House, passed an amendment 
to the 1994 Department of Transportation authorization providing for $150,000 to pay 
their legal bills. On December 7, 1994, Travel Office Director Dale was indicted by a 
Federal Grand Jury for mishandling travel reimbursements; he plead innocent the 
following week; he was acquitted on all charges the following November. Deputy 
Director Gary Wright was not charged and chose to retire. World Wide Travel served as 
the White House travel consultant for two days before American Express was awarded 
the contract on a competitive bid basis. Still, the White House had received such 
criticism that President Clinton ordered an internal management review of the entire 
Travelgate incident, which, among other findings, indicated that Myers’ briefing on the 
Travel Office’s dismissals was “ill-advised” and that the five of the seven members of 
the Travel Office had been unfairly impugned. More specifically, it found that the 
abrupt manner of dismissal of the Travel Office employees was unnecessary and 
insensitive.... All the employees should have had an opportunity to hear the reasons for 
their termination, especially the allegations of wrongdoing, and should have been 
afforded an opportunity to respond (White House Management Review, 1992) 
Comments by the President consistently reflected that he was generally unaware of 
what had transpired, even after it had become a public issue. He subsequently responded 
to Travelgate questions during an interview with CBS News reporter Connie Chung on 
May 27 that it was not, “…handled as well as it should have been. And I said 
so...[saying] I take responsibility to any mistakes made in the White House and 
mistakes were made in the way that was handled-absolutely.” 
While Travelgate probably affected the lives of various individuals, it most centrally 
affected the institution of the White House and, pivotally, the public’s perception of the 
President and, later, Ms. Clinton. As Drew (1994: 179) observed,  
However valid the criticisms of the travel office were, the matter couldn’t cousin -
- distant or not -- in charge wouldn’t look particularly good have been handled 
worse. The picture that was drawn was of cronyism and looseness with the truth. 
It apparently didn’t occur to anyone that hiring the Little Rock company and 
putting the.... There was a systemic failure within the White House. 
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The Scandals of the German CDU 
Christian Democrat Helmut Kohl had served as the Chancellor of the Federal Republic 
of Germany for almost 16 years before being defeated by Social Democrat Gerhard 
Schröder in 1998. His electoral defeat represented a milestone in post-WW II German 
and European politics. Kohl had presided over West Germany at the end of the Cold 
War and, with the collapse of the Berlin Wall, had become known as the “Unification 
Chancellor.” He was in many ways an icon among European statesmen. 
In 1999, less than a year after his defeat, during an investigation of possible tax 
irregularities over a million Deutsch Mark (DM) donation to the Christian Democrat 
party (CDU) by a Canadian arms dealer, Kohl was forced to admit publicly that he had 
run a series of “secret accounts” for political contributors. These accounts, clearly 
outside the purview of German election regulations, were used by Mr. Kohl as “slush 
funds” for CDU candidates. He later admitted to receiving over two million DMs during 
the 1990s, and possibly additional millions of DMs during the period of his 
Chancellorship. Moreover, in Germany, political contributions greater than 20,000 DM 
are taxed. By not immediately acknowledging them, Kohl had also violated German tax 
codes. This was, in short, a scandal of the first magnitude, with most observers 
indicating a clear case of political corruption. 
Kohl later admitted that he had in fact accepted “undisclosed contribution,” justifying 
his position “…on the grounds that the funds were needed to strengthen his party’s 
standing among the East German electorate” (Hopper, 2000: 2). Kohl refused to divulge 
the names of the political contributors, because he had “given his word not to,” and, 
simply, that “people came first.” Rather, he chose to step down as the CDU’s honorary 
chairman., thus providing some protection from the political fallout to the CDU but 
sacrificing any chance of political redemption. However, Kohl did continue to sit in the 
German Bundestag (where he could and did claim parliamentary immunity). 
Kohl had previously explained in late December that while his acceptance of the funds 
“may be technically in [the] breach, he has committed no fundamental sin and, in 
particular, that there were no [political] favors” (Woollacott, 1999: 2). Still, rumors 
immediately surfaced that this was just the tip of the Kohlian iceberg; for instance, it 
was rumored that French President Francois Mitterand had contributed millions of DM 
to Kohl in the mid-1980s, even though the charges later proved to be largely 
unsubstantiated. (These allegations also surfaced in France, in charges brought against 
President Mitterand by former Foreign Minister Roland Dumas; see below.)   
More troubling rumors, however, were disclosed and corroborated. For instance, Kohl’s 
Interior Minister, Manfred Kanther, admitted that the CDU treasury in the state of Hesse 
“ran a secret Swiss bank account to harbour more than DM 17 million of illicit 
undisclosed party donations.” In addition, Wolfgang Schaüble, Kohl’s long-time party 
deputy and his successor as the CDU leader, confessed that he (Schaüble) had accepted 
“an illicit DM 100,000 payment from a German arms dealer which was not declared in 
the party’s official audit” (both quotations from Kirschbaum, 2000: 2), thus lending 
greater public credibility to the political corruption charges surrounding the Christian 
Democrats.  
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In a not-altogether widely accepted denouement in February 2001, former Chancellor 
Kohl agreed to pay a fine of 100,000 pounds sterling, in exchange for not having to 
stand trial or reveal the names of the contributors. Kohl observed that in paying the fine, 
he would “avoid a lengthy legal process that would be a great burden to him and his 
family” (Hooper, 2001: 1). 
But while Kohl may have found some relief from his immediate corruption scandals, 
the CDU’s problems only continued. In April 2002, The Economist published an article 
entitled, “Corruption in Germany: Too Much of It”, (Anonymous, 2002), in which the 
editors listed eight incidents (six, not counting Kohl and Kanther) since 2001, in which 
state-level CDU functionaries had diverted funds for either party coffers or personal 
activities. In one case, Hans-Joachim Dörfer, a CDU treasurer in Trier, was sentenced to 
ten years in prison for embezzling $10 million dollars from a charity. 
However, what might easily spell political disaster for the CDU in terms of upcoming 
elections has been mitigated by the disclosure that five members of Chancellor 
Schröder’s Social Democrats party were also under recent investigation and indictments 
for various acts of state-level corruption.         
Germany’s political reputation for liberal democracy, in short, fell under serious 
challenge, with Peter Eigen (the chairman of Transparency International) being quoted 
as saying that Germany “is much more corrupt than previously thought” (Anonymous, 
2002: 45); in the annual TI listings, Germany is ranked only 20th (out of a total of 91) 
for public honesty.  The evidence that has been presented to date covers the political 
waterfront in Germany, from its highest office (Chancellor) to local politics. If nothing 
else, it indicates that the lynchpin of the European economy can still be gravely affected 
by the malfeasance produced by political corruptions. 
Recent Political Corruption in France   
Political corruption in France brings a very different perspective to an Anglo-American 
perspective; “crimes of passion” in the United States (witness the impeachment of 
President Bill Clinton over sexual imbroglios and his unwillingness to own up to them; 
see Rozell and Wilcox, 2000; Klein, 2002) that would easily result in removal from 
office and potentially prison terms are often considered as “politics as usual” in France. 
Indeed, the funeral of former French President Francois Mitterand was openly attended 
by his wife and children and his mistress and their daughter.9 Still, even under these less 
stringent rules and a more forgiving electorate (at least regarding le affaire de coeur), 
France has experienced a number of recent political corruptions, or what The Economist 
called “shenanigans” (Anonymous, 2000); in this article, eleven different cases of 
political corruption are noted.  
  
Perhaps the most noted case was brought against French President Jacques Chirac. 
While he was Mayor of Paris, he was accused of using over $315,000 of state funds for 
a personal “slush” fund, which permitted him and his party to travel abroad in luxury 
between 1992 and 1995 (when he became President). Chirac has explained that “the 
money was from an official, but secret fund used to pay for covert anti-terrorist 
activities” (Jeffries, 2001: 1).10 Others have indicated that the Paris has scant access to 
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state funds, especially of this nature. Past that, Chirac has offered no additional material, 
and cannot be forced to testify since the French Constitution offers immunity to the 
President of the Republic. The French Supreme Court has upheld this interpretation.  
The most involved case deals with the huge French banking firm, Crédit Lyonnais, 
which involves a number of French political and business elites, such as former Finance 
Ministers Michel Sapin and Edmond Alphadndery as well of Lyonnais chairman Jean 
Peyrelevade (Anonymous, 2001b). Basically, the trouble has to do with the apparent 
submission of false documents regarding the financial condition of Crédit Lyonnais that 
were supplied to California’s insurance regulatory body involving the purchase of 
Executive Life, a California insurance policy that went bust when its junk bonds 
collapsed in value in the early 1990s. Evidence has surfaced that Crédit Lyonnais 
management was aware that its submissions were duplicitous. While Crédit Lyonnais is 
a largely privatized bank, the French taxpayer does have some interest in its affairs 
since the state (under the auspices of the Banque de France) rescued it from possible 
bankruptcy at a cost of roughly $18.5 billion. So this case has caught the French eye as 
a possible instance of governmental corruption.  
Probably the most stereotypical of the French corruption cases involved M. Roland 
Dumas, former Foreign Minister under President Mitterand, and, more recently, the 
President of the French Constitutional Council, France’s highest court; he had also been 
a hero of the Resistance as well as a lawyer to Picasso and Chagall. In January 2001, he 
began his trial on charges of receiving bribes, most notably from his one-time mistress 
as well as professional lobbyist, Christine Deviers-Joncour. From 1989 to 1993, she was 
a lobbyist for the French national oil company, Elf, with a “limitless” expense account, 
part of which she shared with M. Dumas, with gifts ranging from very expensive Italian 
shoes (one pair was estimated to have cost a thousand dollars!) to Greek sculptures 
(Anonymous, 2001c). Prosecution estimates for the gifts were approximately $9.1 
million.  
The obvious question was why a state-owned company would lobby a government 
minister. The answer, if one subscribes to M. Deviers-Jancour’s account, is somewhat 
circuitous but fascinating: Elf was lobbying Dumas not on its own behalf, but at the 
urging of another state-owned company, Thomson-CSF, which was pressing at the time 
for governmental approval from French authorities to sell six frigates to Taiwan; quai 
d’Orsay was said to be opposed, fearing an adverse reaction from the People’s Republic 
of China. The prosecution estimated that the sale was worth approximately $2.8 billion, 
while Dumas claimed Mitterand’s approval. However, the court said that this particular 
line of defense was irrelevant to the case at hand. 
At their trial, Dumas and Deviers-Jancour were joined by Elf defendants Loik De Floch- 
Prigent and Alfred Sirven (former director of Elf and his deputy). In May 2001, Dumas 
was convicted and sentenced to six months in jail; Deviers-Joncour was also convicted 
and received three years in prison (with 18 months being suspended); De Floch-Prigent 
(sentenced to three and a half years) and Sirven were also found guilty.  
In June, Dumas was interviewed by correspondents from French newspaper Le Figaro, 
during which he accused former President Mitterand as well as a number of his 
ministers (including two current ministers) of dealing in kickbacks and bribes. In the 
interview, he charged that Elf had been a long-time “cash cow” to pass illicit funds to 
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state ministers. He also raised the issue of Elf purchasing an oil refinery in East 
Germany, basically as a campaign contribution to German Chancellor Helmut Kohl; he 
claimed that “Mitterand endorsed the whole [refinery investment] project including the 
payment of commissions because he thought of France’s interests.” (In this charge, he 
was seconded by De Floch-Prigent.) Dumas also suggested that the French justice 
system was protecting “those still in powers of power….I have a few ideas about the 
system and the people concerned -- and the latter know that I know.” (both quotations 
from Graham, 2001: 1, 2) At last count, French investigators were looking into these 
charges.  
As in the case of Germany, if these had been the entire body of political corruption in 
France, things might have settled down. But, as the listing noted in The Economist 
indicates, these case of corruption are only representative of the body of French 
corruption. Immediately following the Dumas interview in Le Figaro, Business Week’s 
International Edition editorialized “Why France’s Hands May Never Scrub Clean” 
(Rossant, 2001). Later that year, viewing the European scene taken as a whole 
(including Spain and Italy) and the generalized lack of response to the literal outpouring 
of political corruptions, Business Week asked, “Is the Corruption Crusade Over?” 
(Ewing, 2001). In its most recent rating, TI placed France three notches below 
Germany, at number 23. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The juxtaposition of the three previous sections are meant to indicate how and where 
NPM reforms might most effectively minimize political corruption. Instead of walking 
our way through the offered examples of corruption, we will overlay them with the 
basic NPM principals (e.g., transaction cost analysis and principal agents theory), their 
attending supplements (or programmatic approaches, e.g., community-owned, 
decentralized government, mission-driven programs, and entrepreneurship), and the 
necessary workaday components (improved accountability and management 
information systems). Table 1 has set out many of these concepts. Let us also expand 
our database slightly by including other well-documented examples (e.g., the Italian 
patronage system and its relationship to political corruption), as well as some of our 
earlier examples (deLeon and Green, 2001). This approach results in both an 
examination of NPM principles and programs as well as leading us to ask some (what 
public management scholars call) “big questions” (see Behn, 1995, and Kirlin, 1966, for 
illustrations). 
We need first to remind ourselves of the working definition of political corruption 
presented earlier (see section 2, above, for the supporting exposition):  
…a co-operative form of unsanctioned, usually condemned policy influence for 
some type of significant personal gain, in which the currency could be economic, 
political, or ideological remuneration (deLeon, 1983: 25). 
It is important to stress that this definition incorporates both economic and non-
economic incentives or motivations to engage in political corruption. We also need to 
re-affirm our recognition (with Rose-Ackerman, 1989 and Robert Merton, 1968) as to 
the systemic nature of political corruption.  
  
International Public Management Review  ·  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 




We also need to observe that all these cases are set in government (read: large) 
bureaucracies; concern over scope, not surprisingly, is one of the underlying NPM 
tenets, calling for community-based, decentralized government. But this remains a 
critical observation when discussing the parameters within which the NPM can be most 
effective. In point of evidence, most governments and their component agencies are 
large organizations, and even larger when one folds in the relevant private sector 
organizations; witness the recurrent corruptions found in the US Department of 
Defense. As public choice theorists have repeatedly cautioned us, government 
bureaucracies have for years thwarted their downsizing and re-organization as a matter 
of self-preservation; and, when forced to re-organize, the desired results have not 
always been realized. Such is the strength of established bureaucracies.  In this regard, it 
was instructive to observe how the George W. Bush administration in the US initially 
rejected the idea of a new administrative department concerned with domestic security 
as a response to the September 11th events, opting for a decentralized, flexible, possibly 
entrepreneurial agency.  Then, justifiably abandoning many of those preferences, the 
Administration turned on an executive dime and demanded Congress create a Cabinet-
level Department of Homeland Security (widely advertised as the largest government 
reorganization in fifty years), aggregating numerous agencies that had very distinct and 
difference missions.  It will be equally interesting to watch how the legislation is 
amended by a favorably disposed Congress (which still wishes to maintain its own set 
of oversights), and subsequently to watch the new Department’s performance, 
especially since it is widely suspected that the new Department is underfunded. To 
return to the main point, however, is seems that corruption is more likely in relatively 
large and unmonitored organizations.  
In terms of principal-agents theory, we earlier posited that most of the corruption 
apparently originated with the principal, that in the case of political corruption, “the 
onus seems more on the political leadership or appointed administration…, and less on 
the actions of the ‘agents.’” (deLeon and Green, 2001: 635) The materials covered 
above, as well as evidence regarding the Italian political system (della Porta and 
Vannucci, 2002; Rhodes, 1997; and Golden, 2000), suggests that political corruption is 
likely to occur at all levels of government (national, state/province, and municipal), 
even if the national incidents receive the most attention. Still, we propose that our 
proposition holds if we amend our definition of “principal.” In the case of Germany, 
while we found corrupt actions coming out of the Chancellor’s office (both as 
Chancellor and as the Chair of the CDU), there is little evidence that the Chancellor was 
instructing state and municipal leaders to act in corrupt manners as his agents; in other 
words, there was no evidence of central coordination. What one might have was a series 
of decentralized principal-agent relationships with, again, the principals appearing to be 
more culpable. 
Certainly a constant redefinition of principal and agent will result in little more than 
semantic frustration and ultimate confusion. For example: in the case of Travelgate, was 
President (or First Lady) Clinton the “principal”, or was their nominal “agent”, Larry 
Watkins, the de facto “principal” while the Clintons were simply sympathetic 
bystanders? Or, in the Iran-contra affair: was President Reagan the “principal”; if so, he 
was certainly not the direct source of any orders to Rear Admiral Poindexter or Col. 
Oliver North. The point, while surely messy, is crucial: if a principal-agent theory to be 
useful in regards to understanding political corruption, it is necessary to explicate more 
  
International Public Management Review  ·  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 




precisely exactly what is a “principal,” an “agent,” and the means by which those 
relationships can be altered. 
Again, the observed “decentralization of corruption” does not negate NPM insistence on 
decentralized government. Kaufman’s forest ranger (1960) is a classic example of the 
benefits that can occur in widely disperse units. Rather, what NMP must do is develop a 
set of programs so principals at all levels are aware of that corrupt activities will have a 
negative effect on (i.e., increase) their own transaction costs. Which suggests not only a 
more aggressive accounting system, but a more complete one as well, that is, a system 
whose calculus includes both expensive Italian shoes and the assured self-destruction of 
a prized career in a nation’s administration. Even then, however, as utility theorists have 
endlessly pointed out, each person has a personal and peculiar utility function. 
Chancellor Kohl knowingly and consciously suffered national disgrace to protect the 
identities of the CDU contributors, whereas Dumas was willing to name other 
participants in Elf’s “cash cow” activities, whereas Poindexter and North were clearly 
willing to “fall on their swords” to protect the President (see “Charlemange,” 2003).  
We earlier posited that “transparency” was only half the struggle in any managerial 
system. Information theorists, at least since Roberta Wohlstetter (1962), have stressed 
that the other important half of a message is that responsible officials need to recognize 
the pertinent information being transmitted and act upon it. One of the constant refrains 
during the Congressional investigations over the Reagan Administration HUD scandals 
was that nobody in authority seems to have understood the HUD Inspector-General’s 
reports that outlined Secretary Pierce’s improprieties (see deLeon, 1983). Dumas 
(admittedly not a disinterred party) indicated that many people knew about Elf bribes 
(even being willing to bribe for another firm!), but nobody acted upon it until at least a 
decade after the fact. The seeming nonchalance in terms of the French citizenry towards 
corruption is widely noted. The Economist has suggested that “It is easy to blame the 
lack of accountability in a culture whose reflex is to conceal rather than reveal” 
(Anonymous, 2000: 54). We may recall Pujas and Rhodes’ (2002: 745) reference to 
France as an example in “political hypocrisy.”  
There are, to be sure, alternative versions to explanations besides a cultural indifference 
towards corruption. Polls in Italy and France have both shown a willingness to 
implement limitations and full disclosure in terms of campaign financing; polls have 
suggested similar findings in the US. More practically, the political devolution in these 
nations expands the number of people who can now readily see their own opportunities 
for special opportunities, many legal, a few less so. Moreover, modern political 
campaigns require greater resources (e.g., advertisements on television), a telling 
argument when so much of Italian and French political life is based upon the patronage  
system and its immediate benefits. In the case of Italy, della Porta and Vannucc mince 
few words:  
The influence of the parties in areas beyond the public administration--from banks 
and newspapers--has led to an occupation of civil society, further lowing the 
defences against corruption and mismanagement.  The political parties have 
occupied civil society not in order to realize long-term political programs but to 
facilitate the extraction of a parasitic rent. (della Porta and Vannucci, 2002: 732) 
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If this argument has some validity, then the issue of how the political parties (and, 
concomitantly, campaign financing) are factored into the equation of reducing political 
corruption becomes essential. The recent debate over campaign financing reform (the 
McCain-Feingold Bill) in the US Congress underscores the complexity of this issue, 
probably across a variety of nations.  
NPM proponents make a case for a competitive governments, with the understanding 
that where politics follows markets (in terms of competition), monopolies are precluded, 
“prices” are reduced, and, overall, transaction costs are lowered. While we are in 
general agreement with this hypothesis, we need to indicate at least one crucial 
reservation. The Italian party system has indeed become more decentralized since the 
days of the Italian Christian Democrat dominance, but the move to a more competitive 
party system has resulted in party oligopolies, or what della Porta and Vannucci (2002: 
792) refer to as a “consociational equilibrium.” Under such a regime, patronage is 
proportionally dispensed as a risk minimization technique rather than a democratic 
function of voters cast per party. Such behavioral certainly warrants additional 
examination. 
These observations lead us to at least one “big question,” namely, the apparent necessity 
for the highly efficient (and hopefully effective) NPM system to enhance its 
applicability by incorporating an infusion of what many have termed “new 
institutionalism” (see March and Olson, 1989) into the corruption equation. As we 
noted above, institutions (and, in the aggregate, the body politic) can assume a life of 
their own, one which might not be conducive to an NPM set of protocols. For instance, 
it is easily apparent that, under present circumstances, New Zealand (through its 
Ministry of the Treasury) is far more conducive to NPM than France or Italy. In short, 
NPM cannot rely on the assumption that all polities have a similar political, social, or 
even economic outlook. 
We proposed above that the NPM was basically even handed to the issue of a political 
ideology, i.e., it would be similarly “efficient” under democratic or authoritarian 
regimes. Our present research does not permit us to comment on this proposition. 
Simply, all the polities in our sample are (to greater or less degrees) functioning 
democracies. We therefore lack the necessary ideological variances necessary to 
comment on this issue. Still, there is an ethical component to all governmental systems.  
We observe that NPM is largely predicated on the underlying assumption of economic 
efficiency and we have seen numerous cases in which officials have opted for high 
ethical standards that effectively undercut (at least short-term) efficiencies.  Robert 
Gregory, writing from the perspective of the highly successful New Zealand NPM 
experience, generalizes, “Economistic (sic.) approaches tend to deny the validity of 
public interest, but if administrative reforms jeopardize the maintenance of high ethical 
standards, then it is up to the [NPM] reformers to explain why any such decline ought to 
be a matter of public indifference” (Gregory, 1999: 67).  
This observation brings us (albeit a bit indirectly) to a second big NPM question: given 
that NPM is results-drive and measured, what does it have to say about the means 
adopted to reach those ends? Which is another way of saying that NPM cannot assume a 
neutral position on matters pertaining to means; were the means chosen by Chancellor 
Kohl to protect the CDU acceptable under the German system of government? One 
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suspects not, given the covert nature of the “slush fund” arrangement. Accountability 
makes a pivotal difference here but the issue is too critical to be left unspecified. 
There are several obvious and important ways in which a serious NPM process  could 
reduce political corruption. An accurate and credible accounting system -- i.e., 
transparency -- would surely have prevented Chancellor Kohl from establishing a series 
of CDU secret accounts. But we need, finally, to suggest that the people who engage in 
political corruption are neither inherently stupid nor powerless; Kohl and Dumas – to 
say nothing of the bankers who lead the US into the Savings and Loan scandals of the 
1980 and the accountants who “cooked” Enron’s books -- were both sophisticated 
political analysts and practitioners. Agents and even principals can almost always find 
ready ways around rules, especially when their own careers are seemingly at risk. This 
raises again the question of political ethics, an area that public administration scholars 
keep returning to (e.g., Frederickson, 1999), but the NPM has only addressed in an 
indirect manner. 
This intent of this article was less intended to understand every nook and cranny 
concerning political corruption, and more to appreciate the specific tools that NPM 
could bring to the struggle to alleviate the incidence of corruption. In this case, it should 
be clear to all that the general theoretic underpinnings of NPM as well as the 
programmatic approaches do have a great deal to offer, strengths that we have 
underplayed. Rather, we have chosen to stress NPM’s shortcomings as a means not to 
undermine NPM but to offer constructive criticism. This essay, then, is not so much an 
exercise in the on-going “war on corruption” per se but as a means of moving NPM 
towards a more comprehensive approach to public affairs in general and political 
corruption in particular. 
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1 In 1997, the Eighth International Anti-Corruption Conference, sponsored by TI, 
produced the Lima Declaration that pledged an international, multinational effort to 
eliminate political corruption. 
2 Berlusconi’s deprivations were heart-felt, as he complained that, “it’s a great sacrifice 
to do what I’m doing... I have a sailboard, but in two years, I’ve only been on it one day. 
And I haven’t been to my house in Bermuda for two or three years. And the same goes 
for my house in Portofino.” (quoted in Bruni, 2003b: A3). 
3 A recent check of the World Wide Web using the Googol search engine, keyed on the 
phrase “political corruption” resulted in over 667,000 entries. In comparison, Googol 
only registered 183,000 entries when queried on the phrase “erotic literature.” 
4 Many, including deLeon (1993) and Johnston (1982) have already disputed this 
explanation. 
5 Indeed, Peters and Welch (1978) subtitled their article on political corruption, “If 
Political Corruption Is in the Mainstream of American Politics, Why Is It Not in the 
Mainstream of American Political Research?” 
6 The Source Book published by Transparency International (1999), especially Chapter 
3, makes this point with some clarity. 
7 This “defense” coincides closely with that offered by the late US Senator Alan 
Cranston (D-CA), who, in defending his behavior with Charles Keating during the 
Savings and Loan debacle in the 1980s stated on the floor of the Senate that he was 
being “singled out” and that all Senators were in jeopardy because “…everybody does 
it: “How many of you could rise and declare you’ve never, ever helped -- or agreed to 
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believe any of you could say ‘never’” (deLeon, 1993: 158). 
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9 Regarding mistresses and the body politic: The British tabloid The Sun quoted French 
political commentator Francois Froment-Meurice as saying, “France is a kind of a 
monarchy. It is natural for the king to have his mistresses around, living in the palaces 
of the republic.” Another commentator added: “Nobody cares. We are French. 
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